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Abstract
We provide a rs t nonparametric ( revealed pref erence)tes t ofthe collective cons ump-
tion model on the bas isofex perimental data. By us ing nonparametric tes ting tools
and ex perimental data,we avoid the us ual problemsas s ociated with parametric tes ts
( e. g.non- veriable parametric s tructure)and the us e of real lif e data s ets( e. g.pref er-
ence heterogeneity) .I n addition,our collective rationality tes t complementsthe ex is ting
nonparametric- ex perimental evidence on individual rationality. Focus ing on dyads ,we
nd that all obs erved cons umption choicesare cons is tent withthe nonparametric collec-
tive rationality conditions .I n f act,the cons is tency res ultsf or the pars imonious egois tic
collective cons umption model ( asa tool f or des cribing dyads choice behavior)are clos ely
s imilar to thos e f or the individual rationality model ( asa tool f or des cribing individu-
als choice behavior) .Thiss ugges t that f or s imple cons umption decis ion s ettings ,s uchas
that cons idered in our ex periment,the egois tic model may be us ef ul f or practical analy-
s is . Still,our res ultsals o s ugges t that the more general collective cons umption model,
whichaccountsf or cons umption ex ternalitiesand public cons umption,can be us ef ul even
f or modeling s uchs imple decis ion s ettings .I n f act,we can interpret that the appropriate
model s pecication als o dependson the s pecic dyad type ( e. g.f riendsor partners ;gender
compos ition)and choice s etting ( e. g.public cons umption or not)at hand.
Ke ywords:collective cons umption decis ions ,Generaliz ed Ax iom ofRevealed Pref erence,
nonparametric analys is ,ex perimental data.
JEL- cl assi cati on:C1 4 ,C9 2 ,D1 1 ,D1 2 ,D1 3 .
1.I ntroducti on
Many cons u mp tion decis ionsare tak en collectively,and many s u chcollective decis ionsare tak en
u nder a j oint b u dget cons traint.A mos t notab le ex amp le ish ou s eh old cons u mp tion; th e di¤erent
h ou s eh old memberss h ou ld agree u pon th e allocation ofth e aggregate h ou s eh old b u dget.Bu t
th ere are a lot ofoth er s itu ationsth at involve grou p sofindividu alss pending a j oint b u dget.
S ee e. g.Ch iap pori and Ek eland ( 2 0 0 6 )f or ex amp les .
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(1988) as a tool for modeling rational collective decision making.1 This model explicitly recog-
nizes the multi-person nature of the collective choice process, with each individual decision maker
characterized by her/his own rational preferences. It (only) assumes that the observed group
consumption is the Pare to e ¢c ie nt outcome of a bargaining process within the group; see e.g.
Chiappori (1988, 1992), Browning and Chiappori (1988), and Chiappori and Ekeland (2006) for
discussion of this Pareto e¢ciency assumption in the context of group decision making. A highly
attractive feature of the model is that it starts from the preferences of the individuals constitut-
ing the group. For example, Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2005) convincingly advocate the
collective consumption model by arguing that individuals (e.g. the household members) and not
the aggregate group as such (e.g. the household) should be the focal point in welfare analysis.
In fact, the model does not only have a solid conceptual basis, it is also well supported
by the empirical evidence; see e.g. Vermeulen (2004) for a survey of studies that focus on
household consumption. Still, existing empirical studies are typically p arame tric in nature,
i.e. they critically rely on a (non-veriable) functional structure for representing the group
member preferences and the within-group bargaining processes. As a matter of fact, parametric
tests simultaneously test the consumption model under study aswe ll asa parametric structure
that is imposed on the model. In addition, the existing evidence is typically based on re al- lif e
data sets, which involves often controversial preference homogeneity assumptions (excluding e.g.
changing preferences) and data measurement problems. These problems can seriously distort
the empirical analysis, and may put into q uestion -at least to some extent- the reliability of the
conclusions that are drawn from it.
These testing problems provide the prime motivation for the current study. Specically, we
present a nonp arame tric(revealed preference) test of the collective consumption model on the
basis of e x p e rime ntal data. The use of nonparametric tools should provide a more convincing
case for the goodness of the collective model (as compared to the existing parametric evidence),
essentially because it does not req uire debatable a p rioris. In addition, the laboratory nature of
experiments e¤ectively avoids the usual preference heterogeneity and data problems. In fact, it
has been argued that the nonparametric testing tools are especially useful within an experimental
context; a particularly convincing case is provided by Sippel (1997), who focused on individual
rationality (see e.g. Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982, 2006) for the corresponding so-called
revealed preference conditions). In addition, and specic for our own study, the experimental
set-up allows for obtaining information on consumption q uantities for the individual group
members; such information is typically not available in real life data sets (e.g. household
data sets usually only contain consumption q uantity information at the level of the aggregate
household as a whole, and do not reveal the individual members consumption q uantities). This
additional information allows more powerful tests of the collective consumption model.
Our study also complements the existing nonparametric-experimental literature that focuses
on the goodness of the utility maximization model for describing rational individual behavior;
see e.g. Sippel (1997), Harbaugh, Krause and Berry (2001), Andreoni and Miller (2002) and
references therein. The collective model, which -to recall- explicitly recognizes the individual
preferences, can be interpreted as the natural extension of the individual utility maximization
model. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate to what extent the model indeed does succeed in
describing observed group behavior, using similar nonparametric tools within an experimental
context. The current study provides a rst such test. More generally, it demonstrates the
potential of the nonparametric analysis of experimental data for gaining insight in group decision
processes; see our discussion in the concluding section.
Apart from a mere test of collective rationality as such, the second main q uestion that we
1Chiappori (1988) focused on labor supply behavior. Browning and Chiappori (1998) extended Chiapporis
original model to apply for general consumption settings.
2want to address pertains to the specication of the collective model itself. The most simple
collective consumption model, which we will refer to as the egoistic model, excludes public con-
sumption and consumption externalities (also referred to as altruism in the following) within
the decision making group.2 By contrast, the most general model, proposed by Browning and
Chiappori (1998), does allow for public consumption as well as consumption externalities. Cher-
chye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2006) recently presented a nonparametric characterization of this
general model; and they subsequently suggested nonparametric tests for data consistency with
that model. As we will show, starting from the nonparametric characterization for the general
model, it is easy to dene testable necessary and su¢cient conditions for data consistency with
the egoistic model.
Our empirical analysis rst investigates consistency of choice behavior with the general col-
lective model as well as with the egoistic model in a simple consumption setting (involving a
very limited number of commodities and a low budget; see the experimental design in Section 3).
Consistency with the simple egoistic model may seem convenient from a practical point of view:
the parsimonious nature of the model allows for a powerful empirical analysis (e.g. in terms of
recovering the preference structure of individual group members and the characteristics of the
within-group bargaining process, and in terms of forecasting group behavior in new situations).
Subsequently, we interpret the cases that are inconsistent with the egoistic model but consistent
with the general model in terms of possible consumption externalities and public consumption.
In doing so, we also consider the specic characteristics of the decision making groups (in casu
dyads; e.g. partners versus friends, and di¤erences in terms of gender composition) and the
choice setting (i.e. possibility of public consumption or not). This can suggest guidelines re-
garding the appropriate collective consumption model to use depending on the specic setting
under investigation.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 introduces the nonparametric tests for
collective rationality. Section 3 presents the experimental design. Section 4 discusses the results
of our empirical analysis. Section 5 summarizes and contains some concluding remarks.
2. Rational consumption decisions: nonparametric tests
2.1. Individual rationality
Before introducing the collective rationality tests, we dene the nonparametric condition for
individual rationality. Indeed, individually rational behavior is a prerequisite for collectively ra-
tional behavior. As we explain in greater detail in Section 3, our experiment contained two stages
for all participants: in one stage they had to choose individually the quantities they wanted to
consume under alternative price regimes; in the other stage they had to decide collectively upon
the consumption quantities under the same price regimes.3
Suppose we observe T individual choices of n-valued bundles. For each observation j
the vector qj 2 Rn
+ denotes the chosen quantities under the prices pj 2 Rn
++; and S =
f(pj;qj); j = 1 ; : : : ; Tg represents the set of all observations for the individual under study. A
necessary and su¢cient condition for the individual behavior to be consistent with the utility
2This is essentially the original collective consumption model as it was presented by Chiappori (1988) (for
modeling labor supply behavior). In what follows, consumption externalities mean that the utility of one group
member depends (positively) on the (private) consumption of other group members; and public consumption,
which contrasts with private consumption, indicates that the same commodity is consumed simultaneously by
several group members (e.g. watching a movie together). Of course, the consumption of a commodity may well
be partly private (possibly characterized by consumption externalities) and partly public.
3One group of participants had to choose individually in the rst stage and collectively in the second stage,
while another group had to choose collectively in the rst stage and individually in the second stage (see Section
3). Changing the order in this way did not yield signicantly di¤erent results in terms of (individual or collective)
rationality.
3maximization hypothesis is that there exists a (nonsatiated) utility function U that rationalizes









Varian (1982) has demonstrated that such a data rationalizing utility function exists if and
only if the observed set S is consistent with the Generalized Axiom of Rev ealed Preference
(GARP). To formally state this last consistency condition, we rst need the following denition:
Denition 1. For a set of observations S = f(pj;qj);j = 1;:::;Tg:if p0
iqi  p0
iqj th en qi R0
qj;andif qi R0 qk; qk R0 ql; :::; qz R0 qj for some ( possibl yemp ty )seq u enc e (k ; l ; :::; z ) th en
qi R qj:
The relation R0 is commonly referred to as the direct rev ealed preference relation, while its
transitive closure R is known as the rev ealed preference relation. Using Denition 1, we can
dene the Generalized Axiom of Rev ealed Preference (GARP).
Denition 2. A set of observations S = f(pj;qj);j = 1;:::;Tg satis es GARP if p0
jqj  p0
jqi
wh enever qi R qj.
The GARP provides the basis for a test of indiv idual rationality . Essentially, this test
proceeds in two steps: one rst recovers the relations R0 and R, to subsequently check the
upper cost bound condition in Denition 2. See Varian (1982; p. 949) for an e¢cient algorithm.
To capture the degree of consistency with GARP, we use the so-called Afriat e¢ciency











j divides the expenditure level that is needed for obtaining consistency with GARP
(mi n qiRqj p0
jqi) by the actual expenditure level p0
jqj. Evidently, rational (or e¢cient) behavior
complies with 
j = 1: More generally, the value of 
j captures the expenditure reduction that
is required for obtaining consistency with the utility maximization problem. The corresponding
Afriat e¢ciency index for the observed set S takes the minimum 
j over all T choices:
 = mi n


j j (pj;qj) 2 S
	
; (2.3)
the measure  can be interpreted as a goodness-of-t measure in that it indicates to what
extent utility maximization e¤ectively ts the observed individual choice behavior. We refer to
Varian (1990) for a detailed discussion.
2.2. Collective rationality: the general model
For simplicity, our empirical investigation of the collective rationality model focuses on two-
member groups, or dyads for short.4 For all dyads, the collective model assumes that each
individual decision maker has her or his own rational preferences, which can be represented by a
well-behaved individual utility function. Since the general collective consumption model allows
for both externalities and public consumption inside the group, it is not the aggregate group
4In this respect, it is worth noting that Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2006) also developed a non-
parametric characterization of collective rationality and corresponding operational tests for the general case of
M-person groups (M  2). We see a nonparametric-experimental investigation of such multi-person collective
rationality as an interesting avenue for follow-up research.
4consumption bundle that generates utility for the individuals, but the disaggregated intra-dyad
allocation of this bundle: for a group consumption bundle q, this intra-dyad allocation can be








with q1 and q2 (both 2 Rn
+) the private consumption quantities of group members 1 and 2;
and qh (2 Rn
+) the public consumption quantities. In principle, a consumption commodity
can be used for private consumption as well as public consumption (or combinations of both).
Of course, for some commodities public consumption can be excluded a priori (e.g. in our
own experiment this is the case for the commodities red wine, orange juice and M&Ms). As
explained in Section 3, for those commodities the specic set-up of our experiment allows us to
fully recover the privately consumed quantities (i.e. the corresponding entries of q1 and q2). This
will prove useful in our following discussion of the so-called egoistic model. As for the current
section, however, we abstract from this information to keep the exposition simple. Ignoring this
information does not fundamentally a¤ect any of the rationality conditions stated below.
Given (2.4), individual preferences dened over the intra-dyad allocation are represented
by (monotonically increasing) utility functions U1(b q) for member 1 and U2(b q) for member 2.5
Thus, both members utilities depend on q1 and q2, which captures the possibility of consumption
externalities (or altruism), as well as on qh, which captures public consumption.
A second fundamental characteristic of the collective consumption model is that it assumes
Pareto e¢cient within-group allocations. Using this, we follow Browning and Chiappori (1998)
to dene a necessary and su¢cient condition for collective rationality. To do so, let us again
start from a set of T observations S = f(pj;qj);j = 1;:::;Tg, which is now dened at the level
of the dyad that is evaluated. A pair of (monotonically increasing) utility functions U1 and
U2 collectively rationalize the set S if and only if: there exists a set of personalized quantities
fb qj;j = 1;:::;Tg and a set of weights

j 2 R++;j = 1;:::;T
	
such that for each observation j




























In this denition, the weight j represents the relative bargaining power (vis-à -vis member 1)
of member 2; this bargaining power may vary according to the specic observation/situation j
at hand. In words, the collective consumption model (2.5) generalizes the standard (individual)
utility maximization model (2.1) by describing group behavior as maximizing a weighted sum
of the individual member utilities. The weighting of the utilities re ects the Pareto e¢ciency
characterization of optimal group allocations.
Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2006) established a nonparametric characterization of
the general collective rationality condition captured in (2.5). To introduce that characterization,










































j  pj (c = 1;2;h):
This concept complements the concept of personalized quantities (see 2.4): b p1
j and b p2
j capture
the fraction of the price for the personalized quantities b qj that is borne by, respectively, member
5The fact that we regard monotonically increasing utility functions in principle excludes negative consumption
externalities within the household. Admittedly, this assumption may be restrictive in some instances (e.g. tobacco
consumption). But we believe it harmless in the present context given the specic set-up of our experiment (which
includes the commodities red wine, orange juice and M&Ms and -in approximately half of the cases- additional
consumption nanced by cashed amounts).
51 and member 2. The components p1
j and p2
j pertain to private consumption quantities and
compensate for consumption externalities: if the private consumption q1
j (q2
j) is characterized by
externalities then p1
j 6= pj (p2
j 6= 0). The remaining component ph
j relates to public consumption
quantities.
We can now formulate the necessary and su¢cient nonparametric condition for rational
behavior in terms of the general collective consumption model (Proposition 1 in Cherchye, De
Rock and Vermeulen, 2006):
Proposition 1. Let S = f(pj;qj);j = 1;:::;Tg be a set of observations. There ex ists a pair of
concave and continuous utility functions U1 and U2 that provide a collective rationalization of

















; j = 1;:::;Tg both satisfy GARP:
Thus, just like for individual rationality (see Section 2.1), collective rationality requires
GARP consistency, but now the condition is expressed in terms of personalized prices and
quantities. Specically, the necessary and su¢cient condition requires that there exists at least






;j = 1;:::;Tg that satises the corresponding
GARP conditions at the level of the individual members 1 and 2.
The condition in Proposition 1 is di¢cult to use in practice, since it is dened in terms






(although the personalized quantities b qj are par-
tially observed; see Section 3). Therefore, in our empirical analysis we will mainly focus on
the following su¢ciency condition, which solely uses the observed set S and avoids reconstruct-
ing (unobserved) personalized prices and quantities (Proposition 4 in Cherchye, De Rock and
Vermeulen, 2006):6
Proposition 2. Let S = f(pj;qj);j = 1;:::;Tg be a set of observations. There ex ists a pair of
concave and continuous utility functions U1 and U2 that provide a collective rationalization of
S if there ex ists a partitioningS1; S2 (S1 [ S2 = S; S1 \ S2 = ;) such that the sets S1 and S2
both satisfy GARP.
Following Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2006), the group decision model underlying
this su¢ciency condition can be interpreted as a situation-dependent dictatorsh ip model. Specif-
ically, for all observations j such that (pj;qj) 2 S1, member 1 is the dictator who decides upon
the personalized quantities b qj, whereas member 2 is the dictator for the other observations.
Or put another way, th e identity of th e dictator depends on th e ob servation/ situation at h and.
Thus, the model implies two separate decision-makers in the household, who are each (fully)
responsible for a disjoint subset of the T observed aggregate group quantities: Consequently, the
su¢ciency condition implies that there must exist a partitioning of the observed set S in two
subsets that each individually meet the corresponding GARP condition; i.e. each individual
dictator must act consistent with the individual rationality condition for th ose quantities for
wh ichsh e or h e is ( fully)responsib le:7
6Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2006) explain the equivalence between the formulation of the su¢ciency
condition in Proposition 2 and their Proposition 4. In fact, they also formulated a necessary condition for
collectively rational behavior. Using that condition, they show that the general collective rationality condition
has testable implications (i.e. can be rejected) as soon as T  3 and n  3; in our application T = 9and n = 3
or 4 for each evaluated dyad. In addition, they argue convergence between their necessary condition and the
su¢cient condition in Proposition 2 for su¢ciently large T. As for our application (with T = 9 ) , we choose to
focus on the su¢ciency condition for collective rationality given that consistency with this condition evidently
implies consistency with any necessity condition.
7In their general setting, Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2006) assume ignorance regarding the speci-
cation of the personalized quantities b qj, whereas in our experimental set-up we do have (partial) information
on b qj.Still, the formal arg ument of these authors is readilyadapted to obtain the same situation-dependent
dic tatorship interpretation for the c urrent c ontext.
6To conclude, we indicate that testing data consistency with the su¢ciency condition in
Proposition 2involves a  nite process. Speci cally, it req uires check ing GARP consistency for
at most 2T alternative speci cations of the sets S1 and S2:
2.3. Collective rationality: the egoistic model
The general collective consumption model presented in the previous section allows for both
consumption externalities and public consumption within the group. As discussed in the I n-
troduction, our empirical investigation will also focus on a parsimonious speci cation of the
collective consumption model, which excludes consumption externalities as well as public con-
sumption. This obtains a model of group behavior in which the utility of each member o n l y
depends on her or his private consumption (i.e. U1(b q) = U1(q1) and U2(b q) = U2(q2) in (2 .5 )),
whence we call it the e g o i s t i cmodel. I n fact, as mentioned before, the speci c set-up of our
experiment allows for recovering the personaliz ed q uantities q1 and q2 (if we exclude public
consumption, i.e. qh = 0). This in turn allows for a necessary and su¢cient nonparametric test
for collectively rational group behavior in terms of this egoistic model.8
To obtain that test, we  rst note that excluding consumption externalities implies for each
observation j that p1
j = pj and p2















= (0;pj) (we can ignore public consumption (ph
j) since qh
j = 0 by
construction). Hence, given that also q1
j and q2
j are fully observed, we e¤ectively dispose of all
relevant personaliz ed price and q uantity information for the egoistic model. Starting from the






;j = 1 ;:::;T
	
for the evaluated dyad, the
nonparametric condition follows directly from Proposition 1 :






;j = 1 ;:::;T
	
be as et o fo b s er v a ti o n s .Th er e ex i s tsap a i r
o fc o n c a v e a n dc o n ti n u o u su ti l i tyf u n c ti o n sU1 a n dU2 th a t p r o v i d e a negoistic rationaliz ation o f










; j = 1 ;:::;Tg bo ths a ti s f yGARP:
Thus, testing consistency with the egoistic model is formally similar to testing consistency
with the individual rationality model: for each individual member we test consistency with
the GARP condition using the observed set b S; e g o i s t i cr a t i o n a l i t yis obtained if both members
simultaneously meet the corresponding individual rationality conditions: Correspondingly, we
can use an analogously de ned Afriat e¢ciency index as in (2 .3 ) for capturing the degree of
consistency with the egoistic model:











































As compared to (2 .2 ), each measure 
j now captures the expenditure reduction that is req uired
for obtaining consistency with the GARP conditions in Corollary 1(based on b S) f o rt h et wo
d y a dme mb e r ss i mu l t a n e o u s l y .
As a  nal note, we indicate that under the egoistic model the group consumption process
can also be characteriz ed as a two-stage budgeting process (see Chiappori, 1 9 88 and 1 9 9 2 ).
To introduce that alternative interpretation, we represent the total dyad budget/ income in
observation j as yj (= p0
jqj): The  rst stage then divides this aggregate income over the dyad
8We also say that a commodity is  assignable if we can observe the private consumption of each group member.
I n the literature on collective consumption models, such assignability is directly related to the possibility of
identifying the collective model underlying the observed consumption behavior (e.g. Browning, Bourguignon,
Chiappori and Lechene, 1 9 9 4 ). I n this respect, the fact that our experimental approach allows us to fully assign
each commodity under the egoistic model provides yet another argument pro using an experiment such as ours
for testing the empirical validity of collective rationality models.
7members on the basis of a so-called sharing rule; this is a function  that maps the price-income








j = yj, with y1
j and y2
j the income
shares allocated to the members 1 and 2. In the second stage, each individual member m (= 1;2)











Under egoistic rationality, the outcome of this two-stage process equals the observed consump-
tion quantities q1
j and q2
j for the members 1 and 2. In fact, given b S we can reconstruct the







use this in our empirical analysis in Section 4.
3. Experimental design
Participants of our experiment were 20 6 undergraduate students (10 2 women). Ages ranged from
18 years to 29 years (mean value = 20 .92; standard deviation = 1.88). As we wanted to analyze
collective choice behavior, both men and women were asked to sign up for an experimental session
together with either a male or a female friend or a romantic partner. This procedure enabled us
to study four di¤erent types of dyads, namely, male dyads or two male friends (friends ( m- m) ;
26 in total), female dyads or two female friends (friends ( f- f) ; 25 in total), mixed dyads or
one male and one female friend (friends ( f- m) ; 25 in total), and romantic dyads or one man
and one woman who were in a romantic relationship together (p artners ( f- m) ; 27 in total).10
Participants were scheduled to come to the laboratory in groups of eight (i.e., four dyads).
Each participant was assigned a seat in a partially enclosed cubicle, and worked individually for
the main part of the session. Dyads were asked to engage in one experimental task together.
Participants were rewarded with money and with a commodity bundle for their cooperation.
Each dyad received money and a commodity bundle with a combined value of e 20 .
Our experiment is similar in design to the one of Harbaugh, Krause, and Berry (20 0 1).
Upon entering the laboratory, participants were given the opportunity to taste small quantities
of red wine, orange j uice, and M&Ms. They were truthfully told that they would be making
consumption decisions with respect to these three commodities later on, and that we wanted
them to familiarize themselves with the commodities. Participants were then presented with 9
choice problems. For (approximately) one half of the participants (i.e. in the 3-commodities
condition), each choice consisted of the three commodities red wine, orange j uice, and M&Ms.
Each choice problem was characterized by a di¤erent price regime; the prices of the three
commodities are shown in Table 1.11
For each choice problem, participants were asked to indicate, according to their preferences,
how much they wanted to pay for, and hence, how much they wanted to obtain from each
commodity, given that the total budget they could allocate to the three commodities was e
9This characterization of egoistic rationality actually provides an alternative rationale for the necessary and
su¢cient nonparametric condition in Corollary 1: given that we know the private consumption quantities q1
j and
q2






j), the maximization problem (2.8) leads to the GARP tests for the
individual group members j ust like the problem (2.1) entails the GARP condition for individual rationality in
Denition 2.
10Homosexual nor lesbian dyads were included in the study.
11This price conguration implies a high power of our rationality tests, essentially because there is no variation
in income (e 10 ) but a lot of variation in prices. [ A similar idea for maximizing the power of nonparametric tests
underlies e.g. the maximum power sequential path presented by Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (20 0 3).]We
indicate that the price variation enables rej ection of the general collective rationality condition in Proposition
1. E.g., for the given prices and income one can conceive quantity bundles that lead to a rej ection of collective
rationality in an analogous way as the quantity bundles in Example 1 of Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen
(20 0 6).
810. Obviously, for this 3-commodities group we can exclude the possibility of public consump-
tion: the consumption of the three commodities must be private by construction. As such,
the egoistic rationality test presented in the previous section e¤ectively tests whether or not
the collective decision process is characterized by consumption externalities (or altruism): in
the 3-commodities condition, dyad choice data that are consistent with the general collective
consumption model but not with the egoistic model can be interpreted as revealing consumption
externalities.
The other half of the participants (i.e., in the 4-commodities condition) was confronted with
nine almost identical decision problems (i.e., they had to state their demand for red wine, orange
juice, and M&Ms, given the same relative price variations as presented in Table 1 and a budget
of e 10). The only di¤erence is that they had the option of receiving in cash any amount
of the budget they wanted to in each decision situation; the price of this additional cash
commodity equals 1 for all choice problems. We note that, because the destination (public or
private consumption) of the cashed amount is not dened, this 4-commodities group has the
possibility of public consumption. [More generally, the fourth commodity of this 4-commodities
group stands for any additional consumption (nanced by the cashed amount) on top of the
chosen quantities of red wine, orange juice and M&Ms.] Thus, di¤erences between the egoistic
rationality results for the 4-commodities and the 3-commodities group may be interpreted in
terms of such public consumption.
Participants in both conditions were asked to make the 9 allocation decisions twice: once
individually and once together with their friend or romantic partner. The order in which both
sets of decisions were to be made was counterbalanced: one half of the dyads rst made the
decisions individually and only afterwards collectively, whereas the other half of the dyads rst
made the decisions collectively and only afterwards individually; Table 2 presents summary
information on the budget shares corresponding with the individuals and the dyads choices
under the 9 price regimes. In case of collective decision-making, participants were asked to
indicate for each of the three commodities (and also for the cashed amount of money in the
4-commodities condition) which percentage of their demand was intended for each individual.
This provides the personalized quantity information that we use for the egoistic rationality test
(see Corollary 1).
The decision problems participants were faced with were supposed to mimic real-life di¢-
culties that both individual consumers and groups often encounter when having to pick their
optimal commodity bundles out of the available budget sets. To enhance the external validity
of our study, participants were told that, when all experimental sessions were over (i.e., two
weeks after they themselves participated at the utmost), they would actually receive one of the
commodity bundles they had put together. They were also told that they would be informed
through e-mail about where and when to pick it up. We picked this bundle randomly from the
set of decisions that participants had made collectively (and we thus ignored the individually
chosen bundles), although they were not informed of this beforehand. The knowledge that each
choice ostensibly had the same chance of actually being implemented was supposed to give eco-
nomic signicance to otherwise merely hypothetical decisions, thus providing participants with
an incentive for making choices that truly represented their preferences.
As making the allocation decisions required a considerable amount of calculation (multiplying
prices and demand for each commodity and adding up to check whether the budget is exhausted),
participants in both the 4-commodities and the 3-commodities condition were encouraged to use
a calculator to check their decisions. Participants could also spend as much time as they liked on
their decisions and were free to compare, reconsider, and correct previous choices. When they
felt that the decisions they had made represented their actual preferences, the experimenter
provided them with the instructions for the next task.
9Table 1: experimental design - prices for
the 9 choice problems
Choice problem Wine Orange juice MMs
1 8 4 1
2 8 3 2
3 9 3 1
4 1 8 4
5 2 8 3
6 1 9 3
7 4 1 8
8 3 2 8
9 3 1 9
Notes: Prices are displayed in eurocents per com-
modity unit. A unit of red wine is 1 centiliter, a
unit of orange juice is 3 centiliters, and a unit of
M&Ms is 5 grams.
10Table 2: experimental results - budget shares for the 9 choice problems
choice problem W ine Orange j uice M M s Cash W ine Orange j uice M M s Cash
4-commodities - 104 individuals 4-commodities - 52 dyads
1 mean 0.186 0.209 0.208 0.395 0.226 0.228 0.232 0.315
st.dev. 0.218 0.181 0.230 0.285 0.243 0.197 0.239 0.267
2 mean 0.182 0.247 0.184 0.387 0.215 0.222 0.200 0.347
st.dev. 0.216 0.205 0.195 0.277 0.246 0.199 0.200 0.265
3 mean 0.164 0.243 0.219 0.374 0.174 0.243 0.263 0.317
st.dev. 0.213 0.204 0.239 0.284 0.231 0.218 0.262 0.278
4 mean 0.345 0.138 0.123 0.393 0.373 0.132 0.153 0.337
st.dev. 0.315 0.188 0.179 0.286 0.332 0.182 0.207 0.273
5 mean 0.325 0.153 0.133 0.388 0.318 0.146 0.194 0.342
st.dev. 0.273 0.200 0.174 0.270 0.288 0.187 0.224 0.270
6 mean 0.342 0.142 0.143 0.373 0.372 0.111 0.200 0.318
st.dev. 0.305 0.211 0.196 0.289 0.334 0.172 0.246 0.279
7 mean 0.214 0.323 0.109 0.347 0.226 0.299 0.133 0.340
st.dev. 0.230 0.290 0.180 0.277 0.254 0.272 0.213 0.294
8 mean 0.253 0.271 0.109 0.366 0.280 0.251 0.131 0.330
st.dev. 0.234 0.234 0.178 0.271 0.242 0.186 0.191 0.274
9 mean 0.235 0.307 0.107 0.354 0.261 0.290 0.132 0.319
st.dev. 0.237 0.269 0.191 0.286 0.277 0.264 0.230 0.287
3-commodities - 102 individuals 3-commodities - 51 dyads
1 mean 0.310 0.361 0.329 0.261 0.331 0.407
st.dev. 0.296 0.248 0.297 0.291 0.226 0.282
2 mean 0.299 0.382 0.320 0.261 0.369 0.370
st.dev. 0.292 0.260 0.292 0.303 0.245 0.283
3 mean 0.261 0.381 0.355 0.211 0.369 0.420
st.dev. 0.289 0.276 0.305 0.271 0.247 0.299
4 mean 0.457 0.251 0.293 0.432 0.232 0.333
st.dev. 0.354 0.255 0.301 0.360 0.253 0.315
5 mean 0.421 0.238 0.338 0.392 0.234 0.376
st.dev. 0.323 0.234 0.293 0.329 0.233 0.299
6 mean 0.454 0.217 0.323 0.440 0.189 0.367
st.dev. 0.346 0.250 0.308 0.367 0.241 0.328
7 mean 0.307 0.443 0.240 0.289 0.435 0.276
st.dev. 0.315 0.321 0.301 0.303 0.304 0.315
8 mean 0.344 0.434 0.227 0.316 0.396 0.289
st.dev. 0.303 0.294 0.292 0.308 0.261 0.305
9 mean 0.340 0.429 0.231 0.329 0.411 0.262
st.dev. 0.318 0.321 0.316 0.332 0.332 0.342
Notes: For each choice problem and each group of observations (4-commodities and 3-commodities), the table
reports the mean budget shares (mean) over all participants (individuals and dyads), together with the
corresponding standard deviations (st.dev.).
4. Test results
4.1. I ndividual rationality tests
We rst regard test results for individual rationality. Table 3 reports on the individuals that
violate the GARP condition discussed in Section 2.1; it gives the number of individuals violating
GARP as well as some descriptive statistics for the distribution of the Afriat e¢ciency index
values (see (2.3)) for those GARP violating individuals. We nd that less than 10 percent of
all individuals (5 out of 104 individuals in the 4-commodities condition and 8 out of 102 in
the 3-commodities condition) violate the nonparametric individual rationality condition. Still,
we also nd that some individuals quite severely violate the GARP condition; see the minimal
Afriat index values of 0.36 for the 4-commodities group and 0.48 for the 3-commodities group.
But, given the small fraction of violations, these may safely be regarded as accidental outliers.
11To gain some further insight into the goodness-of-t of the individual rationality model, Table
4 shows the distribution of the number of GARP violations (i.e. the number of observations j
with 
j < 1 in (2.2)), again for the 4-commodities group and the 3-commodities group separately.
Table 4 tells us whether the results in Table 3 are driven by many or by a few violations for
the GARP violating individuals. We nd that all but one GARP violating individual have
no more than 4 observed consumption choices that are inconsistent with this (observation-
specic) rationality condition. One individual (in the 4-commodities group) exhibits no less
than 8 observed choices that are inconsistent with GARP. But, again, this can reasonably be
considered as a casual outlier.
As a further base of comparison, we also include the distribution of violations corresponding
to random behavior; see the columns 4-commodities (bootstrap) and 3-commodities (boot-
strap) in Table 4. Random behavior is modeled using the bootstrap method for panel data as
described by Andreoni and Miller (2002) and applied by Harbaugh, Krause and Berry (2001)
within a similar experimental context.12 The method essentially mimics random behavior for
each price regime (or budget) by drawing randomly from the observed set of choices under that
price regime (e.g. our experiment observes 104 choices for the 4-commodities group and 102
choices for the 3-commodities group, under 9 di¤erent price regimes). This gives information
on the expected distribution of violations under random choice, while incorporating informa-
tion on the participants actual choices. All bootstrap results reported in this paper (including
those in Table 4) are based on Monte Carlo-type simulations that include approximately 50000
iterations.
On the basis of Table 4 we conclude that random behavior would yield a distribution of
GARP violations that signicantly di¤ers from the one that is actually observed. For example,
random behavior as described above would yield GARP consistency only in approximately 18
percent of the cases for both the 4-commodities and the 3-commodities group, as compared to no
less than respectively 95 percent and 92 percent GARP consistencies in the observed choices. We
may also interpret that the GARP test has a power (i.e. a probability of detecting the random
behavior) of about 82 percent for both groups. In fact, random behavior entails a substantially
higher probability mass for any positive number of GARP violations; and the relative di¤erence
with the observed distribution generally increases for larger numbers of violations.13
Generally, we conclude that the individual rationality model is strongly supported for our
specic choice setting. The next question is to what extent the collective decisions, which are
taken under the same 9 price regimes, are e¤ectively consistent with collective rationality as
modeled in Section 2.2. And, if consistent with the general collective model, to what extent do
these collective choices correspond to the parsimonious egoistic rationality model? These are
the questions that we discuss next.
12This bootstrap method is similar to the randomization method proposed by Bronars (1987), which has also
been used frequently in the literature. The mere di¤erence is that random choices (for each price regime) are
drawn from the observed distribution whereas Bronars randomly draws from the uniform distribution (which
may signicantly di¤er from the observed distribution). We refer to Andreoni and Harbaugh (2006) for a detailed
discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of alternative randomization procedures, and corresponding power
measures, that have been used within a nonparametric context.
13In Section 4.2, we use an alternative bootstrap procedure for calculating the power of the su¢ciency condition
in Proposition 2. For compactness, we have not included the results of this alternative procedure for the individual
rationality test. Still, it is worth indicating that this alternative procedure obtained even more favorable power
results for our individual rationality test. [A similar remark holds for the egoistic rationality results in Table 5.]
12Table 3: individual rationality; GARP violations -
Afriat e¢ ciency indices; descriptive statistics
4-commodities (104) 3-commodities (102)
number 5 8
max imum 0.990 0.990
3rd q uartile 0.987 0.977
median 0.800 0.966
1st q uartile 0.722 0.942
minimum 0.360 0.475
Notes: For each group of observations (4-commodities and
3-commodities) the total number of evaluated individuals
is reported between brackets; number stands for the num-
ber of individuals violating GARP. Descriptive statistics
(maximum, 3rd quartile, median, 1st quartile and mini-
mum) pertain to the distribution of the Afriat e¢ciency
index as dened over the subgroups of GARP violating
individuals.
Table 4: individual rationality; distribution of GARP violations
percentage of group with violations
GARP violations 4-comm. (104) 3-comm. (102) 4-comm. (bootstrap) 3-comm. (bootstrap)
0 95.2 92.2 18.2 18.1
1 1.0 2.9 5.5 2.4
2 1.0 3.9 17.2 18.6
3 1.0 0.0 13.1 11.7
4 1.0 1.0 13.3 13.5
5 0.0 0.0 11.9 12.5
6 0.0 0.0 9.5 10.4
7 0.0 0.0 6.3 7.0
8 1.0 0.0 3.6 4.1
9 0.0 0.0 1.4 1.6
Notes: For each group of observations (4-commodities and 3-commodities) the total number of evaluated
individuals is reported between brackets. The column GARP violations stands for the number of GARP
violations (ranging from minimally 0 to maximally 9). For each group (4-commodities and 3-commodities),
the table reports the percentage of (observed and random/bootstrap) choices corresponding to di¤erent
numbers of violations.
4.2. Collective rationality tests
We rst regard data consistency with the general collective consumption model. In doing so,
we restrict attention to those dyads for which both members act consistent with the individual
rationality test, which obtains 47 dyads (94 individuals) for the 4-commodities group and 43
dyads (86 individuals) for the 3-commodities group.14 The corresponding dyads decisions are
all fully consistent with the general collective rationality condition in Proposition 1. Specically,
we nd that all but one of the dyads are consistent with the su¢cient condition in Proposition
2. The Appendix proves consistency with the collective rationality condition for the remaining
one dyad (from the 4-commodities group) that is inconsistent with the su¢ciency condition: it
presents a specication of personalized prices and quantities that makes the dyads observed
behavior obey the necessary and su¢cient condition in Proposition 1.15
14We note that excluding the couples with irrational individuals in this way does not a¤ect our main qualita-
tive conclusions. Still, because individual rationality is a prerequisite for collective rationality, we nd it logically
consistent to focus our discussion on couples with rational singles. A slightly di¤erent approach is followed in
Section 4.3, when we regard alternative e¢ciency criteria that allow for (small) deviations from exactly rational
behavior (as captured by the Afriat e¢ciency index). See our discussion of Table 9.
15We may contrast these test results with those obtained for the individual rationality GARP condition in
Denition 2 when applied to couples; this actually provides a test for the so-called unitary model, which
13We also regard the power of the su¢ciency condition in Proposition 2; this power estimate
can be interpreted as an upper bound for the power of the necessary and su¢cient condition
in Proposition 1. To do so, we employ a similar randomization procedure as for the individual
rationality test: for each price regime we randomly draw consumption choices from the set of
observed dyads choices (47 for the 4-commodities group and 43 for the 3-commodities group).
The resulting power estimate equals 4.6 percent for the 4-commodities case and 5.0 percent for
the 3-commodities case. While these gures are e¤ectively above the percentage of violations
that is actually observed (namely 1/47 percent for the 4-commodities case and zero percent
for the 3-commodities case), they are far too low for convincingly supporting the collective
rationality hypothesis.
At this point, it is worth indicating that the randomization procedure that is used for com-
puting the power may be subject to criticism; it puts a lot of prior structure on the so-called
random choices by conditioning their selection on the price regime. An alternative random-
ization procedure does not consider the specic price regime, but considers the full set of all
actually observed budget allocations (i.e. relative budget shares) as potentially random choices
for every price regime. For our application, this implies for each price regime 9  4 7possible
choices for the 4-commodities case and 94 3possible choices for the 3-commodities case. This
alternative procedure obtains a power estimate for the su¢ciency test that equals 15.3 percent
for the 4-commodities group and 13.2 percent for the 3-commodities group. While these esti-
mates are obviously more favorable for the collective rationality test, one may still argue that
they again do not as such convincingly support collective rationality.
A much stronger case can be expected from the egoistic rationality model as a special case of
the collective rationality model: this model puts much more a priori structure on the collective
decision process. As discussed in Section 2, the fact that our experiment fully recovers the
personalized quantities allows for testing a necessary and su¢cient condition for such egoistic
rationality, which essentially consists of two GARP tests per dyad, i.e. one for each individual
member (see Corollary 1). Moreover, consistency of the collective decisions with the rudi-
mentary egoistic model should not be counter-intuitive for the unsophisticated decision setting
under study: it may well be that none of the commodities taken up in the experiment is asso-
ciated with consumption externalities; and (for the 4-commodities group) the cashed amount,
which does allow for public consumption, should of course not necessarily be used for such public
consumption.
Table 5 has a similar interpretation as Table 3, but now pertains to egoistic rationality;
it gives information on violations of the corresponding GARP conditions at the level of the
individual dyads members. Although we do have (in relative terms) slightly more violations
of egoistic rationality than of individual rationality, we likewise nd that less than ten percent
of all observations (9 out of 94 individual members for the 4-commodities case and 8 out of 86
members for 3-commodities case) is inconsistent with the collective rationality condition.16 The
other descriptive statistics conrm this close similarity between the egoistic rationality results
and the individual rationality results (in Table 3).
Table 6 gives the corresponding distribution of the number of (egoistic rationality) GARP
describes group behavior as if the group consists of a single decision maker (i.e. the group maximizes a single
utility function). We nd that about 10 percent of the dyads in the 3-commodities group and about 7 percent
of the dyads in the 4-commodities group violate the (unitary) GARP condition. This shows that the general
collective model allows for rationalizing unitary irrationalities. In this respect, it is also worth recalling the solid
conceptual basis of the collective approach (e.g. in the context of welfare analysis), which -of course- does not
hold for the traditional unitary approach. As indicated in the Introduction, its conceptual appeal forms a prime
motivation for our focus on the collective consumption model.
16Of course, stricto sensu consistency with the egoistic model (see Corollary 1) requires that both individual
members simultaneously meet the corresponding GARP condition. When using that criterion we nd that 39 out
of 47 dyads (83 percent) in the 4-commodities group and 37 out of 43 dyads (86 percent) in the 3-commodities
group behave egoistically rational. See also our following discussion of Table 9.
14violations. Once more, we nd that these results (for both the 4-commodities group and the
3-commodities group) are largely similar to those for individual rationality (see Table 5), which
provides further support for the (in casu egoistic) collective rationality model. For example, no
individual member exhibits more than three GARP violations.
The table also gives the distribution of the GARP violations under random behavior. To
obtain these results, we use a similar randomization procedure as for computing the results in
Table 4. But in this case we exploit the two-step budgeting interpretation of the egoistic model;
see our discussion leading up to the decision problem (2.8) for each individual dyad member.
This two-step structure also underlies our bootstrap procedure for constructing random choices:
for each price regime, we randomly select the income share for each individual member from
the observed distribution; and, subsequently, we randomly select the budget allocation (i.e.
the relative budget shares), again drawing from the observed distribution corresponding to the
given price regime. The bootstrap distributions in Table 6 (for the 4-commodities and the
3-commodities group) are based on 50000 such random choices for the 9 price regimes. We
nd that this distribution is very di¤erent from the one that is observed. The corresponding
power estimates amount to about 76 percent for the 4-commodities group and 72 percent for
the 3-commodities group. While slightly below the power of the individual rationality test (see
Table 4), the distribution of GARP violations for the observed choice behavior (including the
observed proportion of GARP inconsistencies) is su¢ciently di¤erent from that corresponding
to random behavior to safely conclude strong support of the egoistic rationality model.
As a general conclusion we can state that our results provide convincing support for the
collective rationality model, which here takes the form of the parsimonious (and therefore pow-
erful) egoistic rationality model; our empirical results provide quasi-equally strong support for
this model as for the individual rationality model. Conveniently, the fact that this rudimentary
version of the collective decision model adequately describes most of the observed behavior in
our experiment seems intuitively reasonable given the simple choice setting at hand. Still, it also
seems interesting to consider in somewhat more detail the about 10 percent observations that
are inconsistent with this egoistic model while consistent with the (albeit less powerful) general
collective consumption model. A natural next question is whether these violations of egoistic ra-
tionality may be interpreted in terms of consumption externalities and/or public consumption.17
This forms the subject of the next section.
Table 5: egoistic rationality; GARP violations -
Afriat e¢ciency indices; descriptive statistics
4-commodities (94) 3-commodities (86)
number 9 8
maximum 0.991 0.999
3rd quartile 0.986 0.997
median 0.944 0.980
1st quartile 0.550 0.958
minimum 0.521 0.925
Notes: For each group of observations (4-commodities and
3-commodities) the total number of evaluated individual
members is reported between brackets; number stands
for the number of individual members violating GARP
corresponding with egoistic rationality. Descriptive sta-
tistics (maximum, 3rd quartile, median, 1st quartile and
minimum) pertain to the distribution of the Afriat e¢-
ciency index as dened over the subgroups of GARP vio-
lating individual members.
17In this respect, it is worth recalling that the results in Tables 5 and 6 pertain to dyads for which both indi-
viduals act consistent with the individual rationality test. This makes it particularly interesting to rationalize
(in terms of consumption externalities and public consumption) the egoistic irrationality of these dyads.
15Table 6: egoistic rationality; distribution of GARP violations
percentage of group with violations
GARP violations 4-comm. (94) 3-comm. (86) 4-comm. (bootstrap) 3-comm. (bootstrap)
0 90.4 90.7 24.1 21.9
1 1.1 0.0 1.7 0.4
2 6.4 9.3 18.5 17.7
3 2.1 0.0 11.0 10.4
4 0.0 0.0 12.8 12.7
5 0.0 0.0 11.3 11.6
6 0.0 0.0 9.3 10.5
7 0.0 0.0 6.4 7.7
8 0.0 0.0 3.6 5.0
9 0.0 0.0 1.4 2.2
Notes: For each group of observations (4-commodities and 3-commodities) the total number of evaluated
individual members is reported between brackets. The column GARP violations stands for the number of
GARP violations corresponding with the egoistic rationality model (ranging from minimally 0 to maximally
9). For each group (4-commodities and 3-commodities), the table reports the percentage of (observed and
bootstrap) choices corresponding to di¤erent numbers of violations.
4.3.  Rationaliz ingegoistic irrationality
To rationalize the egoistically irrational dyads in terms of consumption externalities and pub-
lic consumption, we will regard in more detail the egoistic rationality violations of the 4-
commodities group and of the 3-commodities group. In addition, recalling our discussion of
the experimental design in Section 3, we use the distinction between four di¤erent types of
dyads, namely friends (m-m), friends (f-f), friends (f-m) and partners (f-m).
We rst regard consumption externalities (or altruism). As explained before, we can exclude
public consumption for the 3-commodities group, which implies that the egoistic rationality test
e¤ectively boils down to testing for the presence of such externalities. Given this, we regard
the lower panel of Table 7, which has a similar structure as Table 5 but now presents the re-
sults for the four dyad types under investigation. Table 8 similarly decomposes the aggregate
(4-commodities and 3-commodities) results in Table 6. According to the results in these tables,
altruistic decision makers (who account for consumption externalities in their consumption
decisions) seem to be situated in dyads containing two friends with at least one female member
(i.e. the types friends (f-m) and friends (f-f)). Interestingly, this result falls in line with existing
evidence that females are more altruistic towards friends and other close individuals than males
(see e.g. the meta-analysis of Eagly and Crowley, 1986; Croson and Gneezy, 2005, provide a
recent review of studies on gender di¤erences in preferences).18 In that interpretation, the obser-
vation that all dyads of the category partners (f-m) in the 3-commodities group are consistent
with egoistic rationality may seem paradoxical. Still, this last result might be explained by the
fact that for these dyads the consumption decisions in our experiment (for a joint budget of e
10) account for only a small proportion of the total joint budget on which the partners have to
decide collectively; and thus consumption externalities (altruism) may well a¤ect other (more
important) collective choices not taken up in this experiment. Of course, the evidence in Table
7 is far too weak for drawing robust conclusions; see the small number of violations of the ego-
istic rationality conditions, and the high Afriat e¢ciency index values (with overall minimum =
18In this respect, it is also interesting to note that our results on the sharing rule (see Section 3) seem to
comply with existing evidence that females propose equal split more than males (see Corson and Gneezy, 2005,
for a survey of results). For example, an equal split of the income under all 9 price regimes, when using the
specication of personalized prices that applies under egoistic rationality, is used by no less than 37.5 percent of
all dyads in the category friends (f-f) and 33.33 percent of all dyads in the category friends (f-m),as opposed
to only 13.0 percent of all dyads in the category friends (m-m) and 12.0 percent of all dyads in the category
partners (f-m). In our opinion, a detailed investigation of these sharing rule mechanics may constitute yet another
interesting research avenue in which the nonparametric collective rationality testing tools can be instrumental.
160.925). Although these results should be interpreted as indicative rather than conclusive, they
do suggest the nonparametric collective rationality tests proposed in this paper as potentially
useful tools for investigating this type of questions; specially targeted experiments may help to
further investigate the observed patterns in greater detail.
Let us then consider the possibility of public consumption. As indicated in Section 3, public
consumption is possible for the 4-commodities group and not for the 3-commodities group.
Therefore, comparing the violations of egoistic rationality for the 4-commodities group with those
for the 3-commodities group may reveal whether or not public consumption is relevant within
our choice setting. Again, we make the distinction between the four dyad types. Comparison
of the upper and lower panels of Tables 7 and 8 indeed seems to conrm that violation of
the egoistic rationality model may be rationalized through public consumption, thus suggesting
that such public consumption is a relevant dimension of collective decision making even for
unsophisticated choice settings. Specically, recall that our results for the 3-commodities group
suggest the absence of consumption externalities for the dyad types friends (m-m) and partners
(f-m) in the simple choice setting of our experiment. Under that maintained assumption, public
consumption may explain the observed violations of collective rationality for the 4-commodities
group. As for the other categories friends (f-m) and friends (f-f), because we did observe
violations of egoistic rationality in the 3-commodities condition, we cannot distinguish between
consumption externalities and public consumption in the 4-commodities condition. Still, we
do nd that the violations of egoistic rationality are more severe when public consumption is
possible; see in particular the changes of the descriptive statistics of the Afriat e¢ciency index
for these two dyad types. Once more, we should stress that the current set-up only allows for
tentative conclusions.
So far we have considered egoistic rationality tests at the level of the individual dyad mem-
bers. Of course, collective rationality and thus also egoistic rationality should actually be con-
sidered at the dyad level: a dyad behaves egoistically rational only if both individual members
simultaneously meet the corresponding GARP condition. Our nal Table 9 reports such dyad
level egoistic rationality results. Specically, it gives the number of dyad observations and the
percentage of so-called egoistically rational dyads (again subdivided by type) for alternative
criteria expressed in terms of the Afriat e¢ciency index (2.7): each X% e¢ciency criterion
(X = 10 0 ; 99 or 95 ) states that a dyad is X% egoistically rational if the corresponding Afriat
e¢ciency index is at least X% (e.g. the earlier results in Tables 7-8 comply with the 100%
e¢ciency criterion).19 Varian (1990) suggested a similar e¢ciency criterion for individual ratio-
nality, and he proposed the 95% cut-o¤ level. We apply the idea for collective rationality, and
additionally consider the 100% and 99% cut-o¤ levels.
The results in Table 9 support the same (tentative) conclusions as before. From the 3-
commodities results, we may derive that altruism helps in explaining violations of egoistic ra-
tionality for dyads of the types friends (f-f) and friends (f-m). For example, we nd that
only 63.6 (75, 92.3) percent dyads of the type friends (f-f) are consistent with the 100% (99%,
95%) egoistic rationality criterion. A similar, albeit less strongly marked, result also applies
to the category friends (f-m). In addition, comparison of the 3-commodities results and the
4-commodities results indicates that public consumption can rationalize egoistically irrational
behavior of, most notably, dyads of the types friends (m-m) and partners (f-m). For example,
while 100 percent dyads of the type friends (m-m) are consistent with egoistic rationality in the
3-commodities condition (for all three e¢ciency criteria), only 78.6 (85.7, 92.9) percent is con-
sistent with the 100% (99%, 95%) egoistic rationality criterion in the 4-commodities condition.
Similar di¤erences, albeit to a somewhat lesser extent, hold for the category partners (f-m).
In conclusion, our ndings suggest that both consumption externalities and public consump-
19To be exact, each X% e¢ciency criterion only considers dyad observations for which each individual dyad
member passes the similarly dened X% e¢ciency criterion dened in terms of the Afriat e¢ciency index (2.3)
for individuals. This makes that the number of dyad observations increases for lower X.
17tion are relevant for modeling (even simple) collective decision settings. In addition, they seem
to reveal that the appropriate specication of the collective consumption model may depend on
the specic dyad type in combination with the specic decision problem at hand (e.g. including
the possibility of public consumption or not).
Table 7: egoistic rationality; GARP violations - Afriat e¢ciency indices; descriptive
statistics per type
4-commodities partners (f-m) (26) friends (f-m) (22) friends (f-f) (18) friends (m-m) (28)
number 1 2 3 3
maximum 0.944 0.984 0.990 0.991
3rd quartile 0.944 0.868 0.770 0.989
median 0.944 0.752 0.550 0.986
1st quartile 0.944 0.636 0.550 0.918
minimum 0.944 0.521 0.550 0.851
3-commodities partners (f-m) (22) friends (f-m) (24) friends (f-f) (22) friends (m-m) (18)
number 0 3 5 0
maximum - 0.996 0.999 -
3rd quartile - 0.961 0.998 -
median - 0.925 0.980 -
1st quartile - 0.925 0.980 -
minimum - 0.925 0.969 -
Notes: For each group of observations (4-commodities and 3-commodities; four dyad types) the
total number of evaluated individual members is reported between brackets; number stands for the
number of individual members violating GARP corresponding with egoistic rationality. Descriptive
statistics (maximum, 3rd quartile, median, 1st quartile and minimum) pertain to the distribution
of the Afriat e¢ciency index as dened over the subgroups of GARP violating individual members.
Table 8: egoistic rationality; distribution of GARP violations per type
percentage of group with violations ( 4-commodities)
GARP violations partners (f-m) (26) friends (f-m) (22) friends (f-f) (18) friends (m-m) (28)
0 96.2 90.9 83.3 89.3
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6
2 3.8 9.1 5.6 7.1
3 0.0 0.0 11.1 0.0
4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
percentage of group with violations ( 3-commodities)
GARP violations partners (f-m) (22) friends (f-m) (24) friends (f-f) (22) friends (m-m) (18)
0 100.0 87.5 77.3 100.0
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 0.0 12.5 22.7 0.0
3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Notes: For each group of observations (4-commodities and 3-commodities; four dyad types) the total number
of evaluated individual members is reported between brackets. The column GARP violations stands for
the number of GARP violations corresponding with the egoistic rationality model (ranging from minimally
0 to maximally 9). For each group, the table reports the percentage of observed choices corresponding to
di¤erent numbers of violations.
18Table 9: egoistic rationality at the dyad level; alternative e¢ciency criteria; per type
100% e¢ciency criterion 99% e¢ciency criterion 95% e¢ciency criterion
all 4-comm. 3-comm. all 4-comm. 3-comm. all 4-comm. 3-comm.
all types
nu mb e r 90 47 43 92 48 44 98 49 49
% p as st e s t 84. 4 83. 0 86 . 0 89. 1 87. 5 90. 9 93. 9 91 . 8 95 . 9
par tner s ( f - m )
nu mb e r 24 1 3 1 1 25 1 4 1 1 26 1 5 1 1
% p as st e s t 95 . 8 92. 3 1 00. 0 96 . 0 92. 9 1 00. 0 96 . 2 93. 3 1 00. 0
f r i ends ( f - m )
nu mb e r 23 1 1 1 2 23 1 1 1 2 24 1 1 1 3
% p as st e s t 82. 6 81 . 8 83. 3 87. 0 81 . 8 91 . 7 91 . 7 90. 9 92. 3
f r i ends ( f - f )
nu mb e r 20 9 1 1 21 9 1 2 22 9 1 3
% p as st e s t 70. 0 77. 8 6 3. 6 81 . 0 88. 9 75 . 0 90. 9 88. 9 92. 3
f r i ends ( m - m )
nu mb e r 23 1 4 9 23 1 4 9 26 1 4 1 2
% p as st e s t 87. 0 78. 6 1 00. 0 91 . 3 85 . 7 1 00. 0 96 . 2 92. 9 1 00. 0
No t e s : Fo re a c h g r o up o fo bs e r v a t i o ns( 4- c o mmo di t i e sa nd 3- c o mmo di t i e s ;f o urdy a d t y pe s )t het a bl er e po r t st he
e ¢c i e nc yr e s ul t sa c c o r di ngt oa l t e r na t i v eX% e ¢c i e nc yc r i t e r i a( X = 1 00,99,95 ) .Fo rag i v e nX t her o w  n umbe r g i v e s
t hen umbe ro fdy a do bs e r v a t i o nswi t ha nAf r i a te ¢c i e nc yi nde x( 2. 3)o fa tl e a s tX% f o re a c hi ndi v i dua lme mbe r ;a nd
t her o w  % pa s st e s t g i v e st hepe r c e n t a g eo fs uc hdy a do bs e r v a t i o nswi t ha nAf r i a te ¢c i e nc yi nde x( 2. 7)o fa tl e a s t
X%.
1 95. Summary and concluding remarks
We have provided a rst nonparametric-experimental test of the collective consumption model.
We nd that all observed dyad behavior is consistent with the nonparametric conditions that
correspond to the general collective consumption model, which incorporates the possibility of
consumption externalities and public consumption. I n addition, our collective choice data pro-
vide a (nearly) eq ually strong case for egoistic rationality (excluding consumption externalities
and public consumption) as our individual choice data do for individual rationality: a large
proportion of dyads (i.e. above 90 percent) is e¤ectively consistent with the (powerful) egoistic
rationality conditions. We believe that the intuition for this result lies in the specic (unsophis-
ticated) choice setting of our experiment; which suggests that the egoistic model may be useful
for describing collective choice behavior in simple consumption decision settings. Finally, we
have argued that egoistically irrational choice data can be rationaliz ed in terms of consumption
externalities and public consumption: e.g. in particular female friends seem to behave altruis-
tically, which corresponds to consumption externalities; and some dyads e¤ectively seem to use
(even fairly small) amounts of cash for public consumption. Admittedly, although these ratio-
naliz ation arguments have intuitive appeal, they can at best be interpreted as tentative, mainly
because of the small number of such egoistically irrational dyads in our experiment. S till, in our
opinion they do at least suggest that the appropriate model specication depends on the specic
dyad type (e.g. friends or partners; gender composition) and choice setting (e.g. including the
possibility of public consumption) at hand.
At a more general level, we believe that this rst test demonstrates that the nonparametric
(collective consumption) analysis of experimental data can be particularly useful for gaining
insight in the mechanics of group decision mak ing under alternative choice conditions. For ex-
ample, follow-up research can focus on experimental choice settings that are specically designed
for studying the specicities that cause consumption externalities (or altruism) and public con-
sumption; this complements the existing literature that focuses on altruism in individual decision
mak ing (e.g. Andreoni and Miller, 2002). I n addition, it may concentrate on the bargaining idea
(including the determinants of the bargaining power) that underlies the collective consumption
model. Alternatively, whereas this rst study restricted attention to dyads, future research may
investigate group decisions that involve more than two decision mak ers. I n such settings, one
may e.g. be interested in the number of decision mak ers that are e¤ectively involved in the group
decision process. That is, how many decision mak ers have to be accounted for in order to mak e
the observed group behavior consistent with collective rationality?I n a family context, a closely
related research q uestion is whether and to what extent children bear on the bargaining process
or do have actual bargaining power within households. [ We could not address this q uestion in
our own experiment because participants were undergraduate students without children.]Or,
further extending the results of Harbaugh, Krause and Berry (2001) on the individual rational-
ity of young children, one can study the group decision behavior of young children, including
the nature of the underlying preferences (egoistic or altruistic). S pecially targeted experiments
that use the nonparametric collective rationality tests may enhance our understanding of these
issues.
Another general conclusion of our study pertains to the specication of the rationality tests
themselves. I n particular, our comparison of the general collective rationality results with the
egoistic rationality results shows that k nowledge of personaliz ed q uantities and prices (which
in our case were fully observed under egoistic rationality) may dramatically increase the power
of the tests. From a practical perspective, more powerful tests obviously imply more powerful
recovery and forecasting results. [ S ee Varian (1982, 2006) for surveys of nonparametric recovery
and forecasting tools that build on the GARP test for individual rationality; these tools could be
adapted to the collective consumption context.]This pleads for developing collective consump-
tion data sets that incorporate such personaliz ed q uantity and price information; such detailed
20data sets seem especially valuable given the good t of the collective consumption model.
Two nal remarks are in order with respect to increasing the power of the nonparametric
tests in practical applications. First, it is clear that, if we knew the individual members or-
derings of the (collectively chosen) consumption bundles, then we could design more powerful
tests of collectively rational behavior. Such tests would have a formally similar structure as
the tests that apply in a production setting (where the observed outputs reveal the ordering
information); see Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2006) for the corresponding tests of cost
minimizing production behavior that equally account for (in casu production) externalities and
j oint consumption (in casu of inputs). Within experimental set-ups it is actually possible to di-
rectly ask the participants for the ordering information; this suggests an interesting exercise for
follow-up research. Second, the power of the nonparametric tests may be increased by extending
the existing tests to include the sequential maximum power path idea of Blundell, Browning
and Crawford (2003), who originally focused on the GARP condition for individual rational-
ity. Such an extension could render the nonparametric toolkit for the collective model, which
e¤ectively seems to provide an adequate description of the observed group decision behavior,
particularly useful for addressing real-life research questions (such as the prediction of group
behavior in new situations and/ or welfare analysis).
Appendix
We provide a collective rationalization in terms of the nonparametric conditions in Proposition
1 for the one dyad observation that does not meet the su¢ciency condition in Proposition 2.
Table A1 reports the observed aggregate (dyad level) quantities and the corresponding (member
level) personalized quantities for this dyad. Combining the aggregate quantity information with
the price information in Table 1 (and using that the price of cash equals 1), it can be veried
that this dyad does not meet the su¢ciency condition. Specically, we have for the three choice





such a case there does not exist a partitioning of the observed set S (of aggregate quantities
and prices) that distributes these three observations over two subsets S1 and S2 so that each
individual subset meets the corresponding GARP condition.
Still, the dyad does meet the necessary and su¢cient condition in Proposition 1. For example,
Table A2 gives a feasible specication of the personalized prices for which such consistency can
be veried: assuming that the cashed amounts are pooled to spend on a publicly consumed
good (public good, with an aggregate price of unity), both dyad members simultaneously
meet the corresponding GARP conditions in terms of the personalized quantities (for the goods
wine, orange j uice and M&Ms) in Table A1 and the corresponding personalized prices in Table
A2. Of course, such a data rationalizing specication of the personalized prices should in
general not be unique; alternative specications can obtain the same consistency result (e.g.: our
interpretation of cashed amounts in terms of public consumption is not necessary for establishing
the consistency).
21Table A1: aggregate and personalized quantities for the
9 choice problems
Choice problem W ine Orange j uice M M s Saving
aggregate quantities
1 75 50 200 0
2 75 0 100 200
3 75 50 75 100
4 450 0 0 550
5 0 50 100 300
6 450 0 100 250
7 0 400 0 600
8 225 112 0 100
9 100 600 0 100
personaliz edquantities member 1
1 37.5 25 100 0
2 37.5 0 50 100
3 37.5 25 37.5 50
4 225 0 0 275
5 0 25 50 150
6 225 0 50 125
7 0 200 0 300
8 112.5 56 0 0
9 50 300 0 50
personaliz edquantities members 2
1 37.5 25 100 0
2 37.5 0 50 100
3 37.5 25 37.5 50
4 225 0 0 275
5 0 25 50 150
6 225 0 50 125
7 0 200 0 300
8 112.5 56 0 100
9 50 300 0 50
Notes: Consumption quantities are expressed in terms of the same
commodity units as the prices in Table 1: a unit of red wine is 1
centiliter, a unit of orange juice is 3 centiliters, and a unit of M&Ms
is 5 grams.
22Table A2: collectively rationalizing personalized prices for the 9 choice problems
Choice problem Wine Orange juice MMs Wine Orange juice MMs Public good
personalized prices member 1 personalized prices member 1 personalized
own ( = member 1)consumption oth er ( = member 2)consumption price member 1
1 8 4 1 8 4 1 0.5
2 8 3 2 8 3 2 0.5
3 9 3 1 9 3 1 0.5
4 1 8 4 1 8 4 0.5
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
6 1 9 3 1 9 3 0.5
7 4 1 8 4 1 8 0.5
8 3 2 8 3 2 8 0
9 3 1 9 3 1 9 0.5
personalized prices member 2 personalized prices member 2 personalized
oth er ( = member 1)consumption own ( = member 2)consumption price member 2
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
5 2 8 3 2 8 3 0.5
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
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